Prisoner of the State

One of the mysteries about the events leading up to the Tiananmen Massacre is when precisely Deng Xiaoping decided to part ways with his reform ally, Zhao Ziyang. When Zhao met with Gorbachev, he stressed that Deng, despite a lack of official titles, was still in charge. While Zhao says he meant only to highlight the importance of Gorbachev's meeting with Deng, his detractors accused him of trying to subtly place blame for the political turmoil on Deng's shoulders. It's unclear whether Zhao's comment really cost him Deng's trust. But if it did, the losses of hundreds of lives could ultimately be traced to the paranoia and lack of judgment of one man, Deng, in a time of crisis. Zhao's intimate account sheds no light on the mystery, though it reveals his deep sense of regret for any misunderstanding, and his continued gratitude for his relationship with Deng. Here I'd like to comment on the issue of my talk with Gorbachev on May 16. Deng was quite displeased with my May Fourth speech at the Asian Development Bank conference. However, I'm afraid my talk with Gorbachev didn't just make him anger, but really hurt him. After June Fourth, he told (Nobel Prize-winning Chinese American physicist) Professor Tsung-Dao Lee that I had pushed him to the forefront during the student turmoil. What he actually meant was that I had abandoned him to confront the public alone. Notions of this kind circulated among the populace as well. When I talked with Gorbachev, I spoke of Deng Xiaoping's role in our country and in the Party. These comments were entirely intended to uphold Deng's prestige, but resulted in a great misunderstanding. People thought I was shirking responsibilities, pushing Deng to the forefront (and forcing him to) confront the public at a critical moment. I absolutely did not foresee this. Ever since the 13th Party Congress (in 1987) whenever I met with foreign leaders, especially fellow Part leaders, I always informed them that even though Deng was no longer on the Politburo Standing Committee, his role as the major decision maker in our Part had -not changed. This had almost become a convention. In April, I had informed Kim II Sung in North Korea of the same. What was different with this talk was that the message gained prominence through TV and newspaper coverage. Why did I do this? The publication of Deng's April 25 remarks by Li Peng and his associates had resulted in a public outcry. Students and youths were particularly unhappy with Deng. Because of the dissatisfaction with his remarks, they focused on and assailed his special position. I heard many remarks such as "Why does the Politburo Standing Committee have to report to Deng Xiaoping, who is not even a member? This does not conform with the principles of the Part's organization!" The phrase "hanging a curtain to administer the affairs of state" was spreading. Amid all of this, I thought I should come out with a clarification and an explanation. On May 13, two days before Gorbachev's arrival, I held a dialogue with delegates of workers and cadres from official workers' unions. A worker raised a question along these lines. I replied by explaining that this was in accordance with a resolution passed at the First Plenum of the 13th Central Committee. This plenum had decided that we must consult with Deng Xiaoping on any matters of great importance. This was for the benefit of the whole Part because Deng's political wisdom and experience was richer than that of any member of the Politburo Standing Committee. The answer-seemed to go over well, as that worker did not pursue the question any further. Hence, I thought that if we gave the same explanation through the press, it would have a positive effect on Deng's public image. At least it would clarify that this wasn't a case of Deng grabbing power, but rather a collective decision made at the Central Committee's First Plenum. Therefore, when I met with Gorbachev, I told him that our Party's First Plenum of the 13th Central Committee had formally decided that on major issues, we still needed Deng to be at the helm. Ever since the 13th Party Congress, we had always kept him informed and sought his opinion on major issues. Deng had always been fully supportive of our work and our collective decisions. In fact, the original resolution was not only that we should seek his opinion and keep him informed, but also that he could call for a meeting and make the final decision on major issues. Taking into consideration what the public would be able to accept, I intentionally did not mention this last point. I believed the public explanation that I did make would benefit Deng, and at the very least clarify that it was not an illegal situation, but in fact a legitimate one. There was another reason for me to make these remarks: Gorbachev's visit was a summit between China and the Soviet Union. Which person actually met with Gorbachev was of symbolic importance in defining such a summit. Of course, both domestically and abroad, everyone knew that the so-called "Sino-Soviet Summit" was between Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping. But Gorbachev was the President of the U.S.S.R. and the General Secretary of the Communist Part, while Deng was neither President of the state nor General Secretary of the Party, but only the chairman of the Central Military Commission. My sincere intention was to prominently declare that the summit was defined by the meeting between Gorbachev and Deng, not between Gorbachev and anyone else. Originally, the Foreign Ministry planned to dilute the message, neither avoiding the issue altogether nor being too formal about it; it was not to be included in the declaration or in any formal discussions between the two parties. They asked me to say to Gorbachev, "Our meeting as the General Secretaries of our respective parties naturally signifies the restoration of the relationship between our two parties." But on May 13, two days before I was to meet with Gorbachev, while I was talking to Deng at his home regarding Gorbachev's visit, Deng stated that the relationship between the two parties would be restored after he met with Gorbachev. This departed from the original plan of the Foreign Ministry. I paid specific attention to this remark from Deng. Because of all these considerations, after Gorbachev had already met with Deng, I started my meeting with him by saying that the relationship between our two parties had been restored by his meeting with Deng, that his meeting with Deng was the culmination of his visit. Naturally. I then followed up with discussion of Deng's position and the decision made by the First Plenum of the 13th Central Committee. My comment was meant to explain two issues simultaneously: why Gorbachev's meeting with Deng defined the summit and the fact that Deng's continued position as the paramount decision maker for the Chinese Communist Part was a ruling of the Central Committee, consequently legitimate. At the time, I felt that my remark was extremely appropriate, resolving problems in a natural way. After the talk, I initially received positive responses. Later I learned that, on the contrary, Deng and his family were not only displeased with my remarks, but extremely angered by them. This was beyond what I could have foreseen. Exactly why did Deng get the idea that I had intentionally pushed him into confronting the public, while I was evading my own responsibilities? I have yet to learn who it was or how that person managed to provoke Deng. My intentions were good: to maintain and to protect his prestige, and to do my part in bearing the responsibility. However, it unexpectedly resulted in a great misunderstanding and caused him to feel that I had intentionally hurt him. I indeed feel deeply aggrieved by this affair. I could have chosen to do nothing at all. In fact, it had been unnecessary. I truly, deeply regret it. Why have I placed such special attention to this matter? Because other issues were caused by a difference of ideas and viewpoints. Since I had persisted with my position, even my dismissal from the position of General Secretary was understandable. I started with only good intentions. No matter what kinds of differences I had with Deng over the June Fourth issue, it was a difference of political opinions. Before the June Fourth incident, I had always felt that, overall, Deng had treated me very well and shown a lot of trust in me. It is a Chinese tradition to value integrity of character and faithfulness in our relationships. If I had given Deng the impression that I had diverted blame in the midst of a crisis, then not only was this a profoundly false impression of me, but it might cause him deep unhappiness or even emotional pain. The thought of a man of his years, perhaps soon to leave this world, suffering from such an impression was truly unbearable to me. Therefore, I wrote to Deng on May 28 specifically to explain my remarks to Gorbachev. However, I told him of only one of my considerations, which I mentioned before, that I was asserting that the summit was officially between Deng and Gorbachev, and because of this, I had naturally commented that Deng was still the main decision maker. I did not mention my second consideration, that is, to refute the popular view that he was power hungry, continuing to control the Politburo Standing Committee even though not a member of it. Amid this public criticism, some kind of explanation had been necessary. There was no reply to the letter I sent. I still hope that before he leaves this world (this is what I wrote down seven years ago (in 1992)), he comes to understand the true intentions of my remarks to Gorbachev. Not because after knowing this he might relax anything related to my case: I have no such wish. I know that even if he knew the truth, he would not relax a thing. I only want Deng to know that, having received his longtime trust and vigorous support, even though I refused to accept his decision of cracking down on the student demonstrations, I am not a man who would sacrifice others to protect myself in a crisis. I believe that with such an understanding of the situation, he would feel better. I am truly unwilling to see him leave this world with this misconception. Yet I know the chances of his understanding this are very, very slim. Deng died in February 1997. Zhao never saw him again after 1989.

Zhao is purged from his leadership role as Party elders close ranks to oppose him. Zhao argues that their tactics violate Party regulations, but he is powerless to fight back. Yet just as he refuses to sign off on the decision to bring the army into Beijing, he declines the Party's demand to make a "self-criticism"-an important tool in the Party's efforts to maintain one official version of the truth. Zhao does express concern about how a comment he made to Mikhail Gorbachev was misconstrued as a veiled attack on Deng. I want to raise another issue here, that is, the unfair treatment that I received because of the political unrest in Beijing. I had refused to attend the meeting of May 19 that announced martial law. This made Deng and the other elders extremely angry. On the 20th, Deng called Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Wang Zhen, Peng Zhen, Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, and Yao Yiln for a meeting at his house. Of course, I was not informed. They did not notify Hu Qili, either, so he did not attend. I hear that in the meeting, Wang Zhen furiously vilified me as being counterrevolutionary. Li Xiannian accused me of setting up "second headquarters." In the end, Deng decided to remove me from the post of General Secretary, but added that the announcement to the public should be delayed until after the completion of some necessary procedures. I was brushed aside just like that. This was not a Politburo Standing Committee meeting, since only three of its five members were in attendance. Neither Hu Qili nor I had been removed from our posts before the meeting began, so we were still members of the PSC. In my opinion, it cannot be considered legal to have made such a decision when two members of the PSC had not even been notified. I took a three-day leave, from the 19th to the 21st. Nobody actually told me that I had been removed from my position. Of course, nobody contacted me on any work-related issues, either. Essential communication channels had been cut off, and I had been isolated. I heard through other channels that Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, Yao Yiln, and (Director of Organization Department) Song Ping each held meetings with various departments announcing my "crime." They also organized working groups and drafted documents to prepare for an upcoming Central Committee meeting at which they planned to announce my case. Meanwhile, they assembled in Beijing the first- and second-rank leaders of all the provinces and municipalities to brief them. Through all these important arrangements, the Politburo did not hold a single meeting; nor did the Politiburo Standing Committee make any decisions. The Standing Committee was made up of five members; with Hu Qili and me excluded, there could be no legitimate PSC meeting. All these arrangements were lacking in legal authority. The Party Charter lays out these rules: "When the Central Committee is not in session, the Politburo assumes power on its behalf. . . . Meetings of the Politburo are to be chaired by the General Secretary." It is obvious that none of these arrangements were made through Politburo meetings, and of course they were not chaired by me. Therefore, no matter what organization held meetings, or who chaired them, they were all in violation of the Part Charter. Under these circumstances, in which no one had announced that I had been removed from my post, yet I was unable to use my authority, I worried that I would ultimately be accused of having abandoned my post. Therefore, I talked to (director of the Part's General Office) Wen Jiabao to suggest a Politburo meeting. Wen Jiabao replied that, in fact, the Central Committee General Office had been brushed aside as well. All arrangements had been made by Li Peng and Yang Shangkun, bypassing the General Office. He said that if I really wanted to call a meeting, the General Office would send out the notice, but he believed that the consequences would not be good and hoped I would carefully reconsider. Since I could not call for a meeting, I asked my secretary to phone Yang Shangkun to ask him over for a talk. My intention was to ask him to clarify whether I had already been removed from my position. I also wanted to explain to him why I had talked to Gorbachev about Deng Xiaoping's position within the Part (Zhao expounds on this in Chapter 7). On June 2, (Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) Wang Renzhong and (Vice Minister of State Planning) Ding Guan'gen came to my house and said that in response to my request to speak to Yang Shangkun, the two of them had been sent by the Central Committee and entrusted with this discussion. They said that the Central Committee was soon to hold Politburo and Central Committee meetings to deal with my case and that I should carefully consider preparing a self-criticism. I started off by explaining to them my discussion with Gorbachev. Then I raised the issue of how the Central Committee's organizations could be functioning when two of the five members of the Standing Committee had been pushed aside. Who was participating in the meetings? Wang Renzhong said there had been no Standing Committee reelections, nor had there been any meetings held of late. I said that having taken three days' sick leave, I could understand if I was not permitted to resume work. I had no problems with being asked to stand aside, but I should not later be accused of having neglected my work and abandoning my post. That was the reason I had asked to talk with Yang Shangkun. With regards to preparing a self-criticism, I said that I had not been told anything. Criticisms of me were being made everywhere without attempts to check with me about the facts. Documents of criticisms were circulating all over the place, but none had been shown to me. How could I write a self-criticism under such conditions? If I were to be given a chance to speak in the future on issues that I admitted had been in error, I would make a self-criticism. It was a long talk, lasting more than two hours. I did most of the talking. I spoke about the conditions and my views on the April 26 editorial, the speech on May 3 to the youth delegates, the May Fourth speech at the ADB meeting, and my refusal to attend the May 19 meeting to announce martial law. And lastly, I strongly protested the way in which they had detained Bao Tong. On May 28, Bao Tong had been called in by the Department of Organization for a talk, from which he never returned. Meanwhile, they searched his office. I had immediately asked my secretary to call (Director of Organization Department) Song Ping to voice my protest. To Wang Renzhong and Ding Guan'gen I said, "If they believe Bao Tong has done anything wrong, the appropriate Part organization should conduct an investigation, but they must proceed according to the Part Charter and the law. Part organizations, much less the Department of Organization, have no authority to deprive him of his personal freedom. We are now in the 1980s; we cannot use these old methods of past political campaigns." I demanded that they relay my message to the Central Committee. In their assessment of this talk, they deemed my attitude to have been very bad indeed. Wang Renzhong and Ding Guan'gen returned to my home on June 17. They said that on June 19 the Central Committee would hold a Politburo meeting to deal with my case, and they requested that I appear modest, show restraint, and keep calm even if some of the elders used harsh words. I could choose to speak or remain silent, but I was not to argue excessively. I replied, "If this is a meeting to deal with my case, I must be given the chance to speak freely." Ding Guan'gen also asked me to reflect seriously on my faults and adopt a proper attitude for the meeting. Wang Renzhong revealed that internally they had decided to maintain my Central Committee membership and Hu Qili's Politburo membership. * He also said that they had already relayed my opinion of Bao Tong's "isolation and investigation" to the Central Committee; Bao Tong was now under "surveillance and house arrest," which (they said) conforms with proper legal procedures. * Hu Qili, who had sided with Zhao in taking a soft line toward the student demonstrations, was also purged from the top ranks of the Part, losing his slot on the elite Politburo Standing Committee. It seems the purpose of their visit was: one, to notify me about the upcoming meeting, and two, to persuade me not to stage a challenge, or to keep my arguments to a minimum. When Wang Renzhong and Ding Guan'gen first came to my house on June 2 to inform me of the meeting arranged to deal with my case, they said that Deng Xiaoping had mentioned that the handling of Hu Yaobang's case had resulted in criticisms both at home and abroad, so this time with Zhao's case, we must follow proper procedures. He directed them to prepare proper documentation; as soon as these documents were ready, a meeting would be held. It was all a terrific irony. In fact, I had already been detained and isolated by them without justification or legality. First they illegally deposed me from my position as General Secretary, then they claimed to be in accordance with procedures. This shows that they were apprehensive; afraid of criticism from others. They would have held the meeting earlier, but it was delayed by the events of June Fourth.

Zhao's final attempts to soften the government's response to the protests fall short, as Deng lines up in support of Premier Li Peng's tough stance. At a tense meeting at Deng's home, which Zhao describes in some detail, the paramount leader authorizes the imposition of martial law. Zhao is opposed and refuses to carry out the policy; he is soon excluded from decision making. Zhao visits Tiananmen Square to urge the students to return to campus, but it's too late. He learns of the June Fourth crackdown when he hears gunshots from his home. Having grown entirely disillusioned with the government dialogues, the students decided to use the occasion of Gorbachev's visit to stage large-scale street demonstrations and a hunger strike. They believed it was the best opportunity to exert pressure on the government, which would be compelled to show tolerance during the state visit. But the students were mistaken, for the more they pushed ahead, the more pretext Li Peng and his associates had to crack down on them using violent means. When I got wind of this, I took the opportunity to deliver a speech on May 13 at a gathering of workers. Roughly, what I told them was that it would be unreasonable for the students to disturb international state talks and do damage to the Sino-Soviet Summit because their demands had not been satisfied. Moreover, it would not gain the support of most people. I hoped they would take the big picture into consideration, and not injure our friends while delighting our enemies. My plea was printed in all the major papers. However, the students did not respond to it at all; they proceeded regardless. On the afternoon of May 13, more than two hundred students from more than twenty universities, with more than a thousand others to act as guards, entered Tiananmen Square to stage a sit-in and a hunger strike. From this day on, the students occupied the square, up until the bloody incident of June Fourth. The student hunger strike received widespread sympathy and support. Tens of thousands of people from various government departments and other organizations as well as ordinary urban residents staged demonstrations in support. The numbers grew from day to day. The number of hunger strike participants also increased, reaching between two and three thousand people at its peak. Students had become enthralled by the situation, making it even harder to persuade them to leave. At the time, the students' actions were still mostly spontaneous. Even though they had formed a command center, not one leader among them could make a coolheaded decision. Even when a decision was made, it was not authoritative in any way. Leaders were changed frequently at the command center, and things proceeded according to the ideas of whoever's voice was loudest and most rousing. We tried to persuade the student leaders by mobilizing university leaders and professors to talk to them, but these efforts fell on deaf ears. Because of Li Peng and his associates, the principal guidelines of reducing tension, opening dialogue, and persuasion had not been implemented. On the fourth day of the hunger strike, some of the students began fainting. I was extremely worried that if this continued, some students might die. We would have a hard time answering to our people. On the night of May 16, after meeting with Gorbachev, I called a Politburo Standing Committee meeting to discuss issuing a public statement in the name of its five members to urge the students to stop their hunger strike. The draft contained the sentence "The passionate patriotism of the students is admirable, and the Central Committee and the State Council approve of their deeds." Li Peng opposed it, saying, "Mentioning 'admirable' is quite enough. Do we have to also add that we 'approve'?" Yang Shangkun replied, "The students propose action against corrption. We can say we approve of this." I was quite repelled by Li Peng's attitude, and said, "If we don't mention 'approval: it's as if we'd said nothing at all. Then what's the purpose of issuing a statement? Our current task is to issue a statement that will calm the students' emotions. We must not now quibble over the wording." A majority of the Standing Committee members agreed to include this line, so it was narrowly passed. However, by this time I believed that the situation had progressed to a tage where even this statement would not end the hunger strike, since the strongest demand was a reversal of the April 26 editorial's characterization of the demostrations. I felt that this was a problem that we could no longer bypass. If this key issue was not resolved, there would be no way to end the hunger strike and proceed with dialogue. If the hunger strike continued, then unpredictable but extremely grave consequences would follow. So for the first time, I formally proposed revising the judgment of the April 26 editorial in a Politburo Standing Committee meeting. Li Peng immediately opposed this. He said the designation contained in the April 26 editorial was drafted strictly according to Deng Xiaoping's own words and therefore could not be changed. My rebuttal was that the editorial had been drafted according to the minutes fo the April 24 Politburo Standing Committee meeting andthat Deng Had merely voiced support of the discussion that came out of that meeting. Yang Shangkun warned that revising the April 26 editorial would damage Deng Xiaoping's image. I replied that we could arrange matters in such a way as to aviod causing any damage to Deng's reputation by having the Politburo Standing Committee take collective responsibility. I also said that since I had sent the telegram from North Korea agreeing with Deng's decision, I should take responsibility for the April 26 editorial. If necessary, it could be added that I had approved it. Li Peng said abruptly, "This is not the proper attitude of a politician!" The result was that a revision of the April 26 editorial was unable to proceed. I had no other choice but to express my views to Deng personally, in a face-to-face meeting. On the 17th, I phoned to request to see Deng. Later, a member of Deng's staff asked me to go to Deng Xiaoping's home in the afternoon for a meeting. All the members of the Politburo Standing Committee plus (Yang) Shangkun were already there. At the time, Wan Li, who would have attended, was still abroad. Since I had asked for a personal meeting with Deng, only to have Deng call for a full Standing Committee meeting at his home, I realized that things had already taken a bad turn. First, I expressed my views, roughly as follows: The situation with the student demonstrations has worsened, and has grown extremely grave. Students, teachers, journalists, scholars, and even some government staff have taken to the streets in protest. Today, there were approximately 300,000 to 400,000 people. Quite a large number of workers and peasants are also sympathetic. Besides the hot issues of corruption and government transparency, the main impetus for all these different social groups is that they want an explanation for how the Party and the government can be so coldhearted in the face of hungerstriking students, doing nothing to try to save them. The key issue blocking dialogue with the students is the judgment passed by the April 26 editorial. The editorial, which caused so much misunderstanding, must have been unclear or incorrectly expressed in some way. The only way to bring about some kind of resolution would be to somewhat relax the judgment from this editorial. This is the key and, if adopted, will gain wide social support. If we remove the labeling of the student movement, we will regain control over the situation. If the hunger strike continues and some people die, it will be like gasoline poured over a flame. If we take a confrontational stance with the masses, a dangerous situation could ensue in which we lose complete control. While I was expressing my views, Deng appeared very impatient and displeased. As soon as I had finished speaking, Li Peng and Yao Yilin immediately stood up to criticize me. They placed blame for the escalation of the demonstrations entirely on the May Fourth speech I presented to the Asian Development Bank. That was the first time I heard them voice criticisms of my ADB speech. Though they had opposed it in actuality, they had never said so openly before. The intensity of their accusations caught me completely by surprise. From the unrestrained way in which these two attacked me, I could see that they had already gained Deng Xiaoping's tacit approval. Hu Qili expressed his view that the editorial should be revised. Qiao Shi equivocated. (Yang) Shangkun opposed revising the editorial, thereby having a very bad impact on the situation. He said, "Liao Hansheng believes that martial law should be imposed. Perhaps we should consider imposing martial law..." Previously, Shangkun had always opposed martial law, but this time he quoted (veteran military leader) Liao Hansheng, when in fact he himself had changed his position. In the end, Deng Xiaoping made the final decision. He said, "The development of the situation has only confirmed that the judgment of the April 26 editorial was correct. The reason that the student demonstrations have not subsided is something within the Party, and that is Zhao's May Fourth speech at the ADB meeting. Since there is no way to back down now without the situation spiraling completely out of control, the decision is to move troops into Beijing to impose martial law." He also appointed Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, and Qiao Shi as a threeperson team to implement the imposition of martial law. When Deng was finished, I said that having a decision was always better than not having one, but I was extremely worried about the grave consequences this would have. As General Secretary, it would be difficult for me to manage and effectively carry out this decision. Deng said, "If this turns out to be a wrong decision, we wil all be responsible." During this meeting, Li Peng also claimed that contents of Politburo Standing Committee meetings had been leaked to the public, and that there were some bad elements on the inside, (Political Secretary of the PSC) Bao Tong being one of them. I replied, "You must be responsible when making such claims! What evidence do you have?" He said, "I do have evidence that I wil reveal to you later." I walked out as soon as the meeting adjourned. If Deng asked the others to remain or discussed other matters, I never knew. At that moment, I was extremely upset. I told myself that no matter what, I refused to become the General Secretary who mobilzed the miltary to crack down on students. Upon returning home, under heightened emotions, I called on Bao Tong to draft a letter of resignation for me to send to the Standing Committee. At that evening's meeting to brief the Standing Committee, I refused to accept the assignment to chair the meeting of cadres to announce martial law. I said, "It seems my mission in history has already ended." Yang Shangkun replied to me, "This kind of issue cannot be raised now. No changes in leadership should be made." He meant that my position as General Secretary should not be changed. As soon as my letter of resignation reached the Service Bureau of the Central Committee General Office, Shangkun found out about it. He phoned me and repeatedly beseeched me to revoke my decision. Shangkun said, "If this information leaks out, then the situation will be even worse. We should not pour gasoline on a flame." I conceded his argument and on May 18 notified the General Office to halt the distribution of the letter. My secretary (Li Shuqiao) later retrieved it. Here I would like to clarify something about this meeting called by Deng that resolved to impose martial law and crack down on the students. There has been public hearsay that the Politburo Standing Committee meeting resulted in a vote of three against two, but in fact there was no "three versus two" vote. There were only a few people in attendance. Among the members of the Standing Committee, it was two against two: Hu Qili and I were for revising the editorial, Yao Yilin and Li Peng were ardently opposed, and Qlao Shi remained neutral by not expressing any clear view. There was no such thing as a "three versus two" vote. Of course, if the opinions of Deng and Yang, who were not members of the Standing Committee, were added, in the overall count of all the people who attended that meeting, they were certainly a majority. However, in fact, the Standing Committee held no formal vote. During those few days, many prominent people and senior Party comrades phoned or wrote letters to me and to the Central Committee, appealing to us to treat the students properly, to acknowledge that the students' actions had been patriotic, and to change the wrongful stance assumed toward the students. Among them were those whom Deng Xiaoping had always held in high regard, such as senior comrades like Li Yimang. On May 18, I forwarded a selection of these letters to Deng and wrote to him to reiterate my position, hoping he would reconsider. Though I knew there was very little hope of this, I had to make one last attempt. The original text of my letter is as follows: Comrade Xiaoping, I have forwarded several appeals from influential senior comrades. I hope you will read them. The current situation is extremely grave, the most urgent matter of which is to stop the student hunger strike (for which people feel great sympathy) so as to avoid any deaths. The crucial request that must be granted in order to stop the hunger strike is the reversal of the labeling and judgment made of them in the April 26 editorial, and acknowledgment of their actions as patriotic. I have considered this carefully, and feel we must, however painful, resolve to make this concession. So long as our key leaders personally go out among the masses and admit this, the intensity of emotions will be greatly reduced, and then other matters can be resolved. Even if you must eventually take some resolute measures to maintain-order, we must take this step first. Otherwise, imposing harsh measures while a majority of people are adamantly opposed may result in serious repercussions that threaten the fate of the Part and the state. With profound concern, I again appeal to you to consider this suggestion. ZhaoZiyang May 18 This was the first letter that I sent to him after the May 17 meeting at his house that decided upon the imposition of martial law. As I'd expected, there was no reply. On the evening of May 17, the Central Committee General Office made arrangements for leaders of the Central Committee to visit the hunger-striking students who were in the hospital. Li Peng initially said he would not go, but just as the van started up to leave, he showed up. It turns out that he had changed his mind after hearing that I was going. The same thing happened on the early morning of May 19 when I went to visit the students in Tiananmen Square. He opposed my going and urged the General Office to stop me. I felt that with so many students on hunger strike for as many as seven days, it had become indefensible that none of the leaders of the Central Committee had paid a visit. I insisted on going, saying that if no others went, I would go alone. Once he saw that I was intent upon going and could not be deterred, he changed his mind. But he was terrified and fled very soon after we arrived at the square. Besides greeting the students, I improvised a speech that ended up being printed in all the major newspapers in the capital. When I spoke, I was merely trying to persuade them to end the hunger strike, telling them they were still young and must treasure their lives. I knew all too well that though their actions had won widespread sympathy both across the country and abroad, it was of no use against the group of elders who had taken a hard-line position. It would not matter if the hunger strike continued or if some people died; they (the elders) would not be moved. I felt it was a waste for these young students to end their lives like this. However, the students did not understand what I meant. Even less could they imagine the treatment in store for them. Of course, I was later the target of harsh criticisms and accusations for this speech to the students. After the meeting at Deng's home on May 17, Li Peng and his associates acted abnormally in many ways. Whether I was going to the hospital or to the square to visit students, he repeatedly attempted to block me. When I arrived and I exited the van, he rushed out in front of me, which was contrary to custom. Someone later told me that he instructed people to hint to the cameramen not to include images of me, because it would become "inconvenient" in the case of future leadership changes. From the evening of May 17 to May 19, none of the issues regarding martial law were imparted to me. I only learned about Li Peng's dialogue with the students on the 19th from seeing it on television. On the afternoon of the 19th, however, I was suddenly delivered a notice for the meeting that would announce the imposing of martial law and given the text of his (Li Peng's) speech, and was asked to chair and speak at the meeting. Yet I was not notified about how this meeting was to proceed, where it would be held, who would attend, or what other items were to be on the agenda. His speech even included the statement, "The student demonstrations escalated after May Fourth." Later, they must have felt that the statement too blatantly placed the blame on my May Fourth speech, so when it was published in the newspapers, it was changed to "The student demonstrations escalated in early May." This was an open implication that my May Fourth speech had caused the escalation of demonstrations. Li Peng also announced to members of the State Council that I had made a big mistake. They also held an exclusive meeting prior to the larger meeting to announce martial law. All of this added to my realization that I had been excluded from decision making. To this day, I still don't know when that decision was made. On the 17th at Deng's place, when deciding to impose martial law, even though Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, and Qiao Shi were appointed to conduct the affair, Deng also noted that "Zhao is still the General Secretary." But in fact, in the several days that followed, I was entirely pushed aside. On the 19th, I applied for a three-day leave from the Politburo. I suggested that Li Peng chair the Politburo Standing Committee and refused to attend the mobilization meeting to announce martial law. At the time, the number of demonstrators supporting the hunger strike in Tiananmen Square had become much smaller. The hunger strike was abandoned and turned into a sit-in. Many of the Beijing university students had already returned to their schools. Those who remained in the square were mostly students from other cities. The announcement of martial law on May 19 (actually May 20) was another stimulant, once again mobilizing the masses. Participants of the sit-in increased and supporters from other social groups crowded the streets. Beijing residents were particularly aggrieved by the decision to call troops to Beijing to execute martial law. Troops that received their orders were blocked along their way, everywhere. Groups of old ladies and children slept on the roads. Troops were stopped in the suburbs of Beijing, unable to enter the city. The standoff lasted more than ten days. On May 21, Qiao Shi came to my house to discuss the situation. He said, "Quite a number of people are feeling like they are 'riding a tiger, unable to get off: If it were not for Deng's insistence and his decision to call more troops to Beijing, a great tragedy might be avoided. But now the troops have been blocked from entering, martial law is ineffective, and milions of students, residents, workers, and cadres from government organizations are out on the streets or gathered on Tiananmen Square. If this continues, the capital is in danger of becoming paralyzed." At that moment, I thought that perhaps if we held the National People's Congress Standing Committee meeting ahead of schedule we could allow the NPC, the organization with proper authority, to use the means of democracy and law to turn the situation around. On May 21, I spoke to (Central Committee Secretariat member) Yan Mingfu about this idea, and asked him to speak with (Yang) Shangkun to see if it was feasible. Before this, (NPC vice chairman) Peng Chong had come over to talk. He said that since Wan Li was abroad, he (Peng Chong) had held a meeting with the heads of the NPC committee. They all felt that an NPC Standing Committee meeting should be held. He also went to Yuquanshan (Jade Spring Mountain, west of Beijing) to visit (influential Party elder) Peng Zhen, who also agreed that this should be done. They had already written a report to the Central Committee requesting that Wan Li return from abroad ahead of schedule. In the afternoon of the 21st, (PSC member) Hu Qili came to my house to report that no one had responded to the request to have Wan Li return. It was in limbo. I asked Hu Qili to tell Peng Chong to telegram Wan Li directly in the name of the Part Group of the NPC to request his return. Hu Qili asked if he could say that I had agreed to this, and I said, "Yes." I then phoned (Vice Premier) Wu Xueqian and asked him to find a way to send the telegram. I later learned that Li Peng sent another telegram to Wan Li to tell him not to return. It is possible that he had Deng's prior approval, so Wan Li was unable to make an early return. On the night of June 3rd, while sitting in the courtard with my family, I heard intense gunfire. A tragedy to shock the world had not been averted, and was happening after all. I prepared the above written material three years after the June Fourth tragedy. Many years have now passed since this tragedy. Of the activists involved in this incident, except for the few who escaped abroad, most were arrested, sentenced, and repeatedly interrogated. The truth must have been determined by now. Certainly the following three questions should have been answered by now. First, it was determined then that the student movement was "a planned conspiracy" of anti-Part, anti-socialist elements with leadership. So now we must ask, who were these leaders? What was the plan? What was the conspiracy? What evidence exists to support this? It was also said that there were "black hands" within the Part. Then who were they? Second, it was said that this event was aimed at overthrowing the People's Republic and the Communist Party. Where is the evidence? I had said at the time that most people were only asking us to correct our flaws, not attempting to overthrow our political system. After so many years, what evidence has been obtained through the interrogations? Have I been proven right, or have they? Many of the democracy activists in exile say that before June Fourth, they had still believed that the Part could improve itself. After June Fourth, however, they saw the Part as hopeless and only then did they take a stand to oppose the Party. During the demonstrations, students raised many slogans and demands, but the problem of inflation was conspicuously missing, though inflation was a hot topic that could easily have resonated with and ignited all of society. If the students had intended on opposing the Communist Part back then, why hadn't they utilized this sensitive topic? If intent on mobilizing the masses, wouldn't it have been easier to raise questions like this one? In hindsight, it's obvious that the reason the students did not raise the issue of inflation was that they knew that this issue was related to the reform program, and if pointedly raised to mobilize the masses, it could have turned out to obstruct the reform process. Third, can it be proven that the June Fourth movement was "counterrevolutionary turmoil," as it was designated? The students were orderly. Many reports indicate that on the occasions when the People's Liberation Army came under attack, in many incidents it was the students who had come to its defense. Large numbers of city residents blocked the PLA from entering the city. Why? Were they intent on overthrowing the republic? Of course, whenever there are large numbers of people involved, there will always be some tiny minority within the crowd who might want to attack the PLA. It was a chaotic situation. It is perfectly possible that some hooligans took advantage of the situation to make trouble, but how can these actions be attributed to the majority of the citizens and students? By now, the answer to this question should be clear.

As the protests escalate, the political stakes get higher. Zhao returns to Beijing and tries to calm things down. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev'spending visit to China gives protesters leeway, since the Party isn't likely to crack down violently on the eve of this trip. Hard-line Premier Li Peng opposes Zhao's effort to deal leniently with the situation, and both sides try to win over paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. Tensions escalate when Shanghai offcials shut down a bold newspaper that they feel has gone too far in its reporting on the protests. I have described above how, during my visit to North Korea, the guidelines laid out to deal with the student demonstrations were changed by Li Peng and others at home. Now I wil address the struggle between the two sharply conflcting approaches to the student demonstrations that occurred after my return from North Korea. Li Peng's decision to disseminate Deng Xiaoping's remarks on April 25 and 26 throughout Beijing and down to local administrative levels resulted in many criticisms of Deng. This really upset Deng and his family. Deng's family accused Li Peng of having abruptly pushed Deng to the front lines while he himself played the good guy. Given the above situation, and because the editorial provoked large demonstrations on April 27 and widespread criticism, Li Peng felt pressured to ask (Political Secretary of the Politburo Standing Committee) Bao Tong to draft an editorial on April 29 and to request that (State Council spokesman) Yuan Mu and (State Education Commission Vice Minister) He Dongchang hold a dialogue with the students. During the resulting dialogue session, they (Yuan Mu and He Dongchang) responded positively to many of the students' pleas, conceded that many of the students' objectives were the same as those held by the Part and the government, and explained that the editorial was not directed against the students. They even declared that 99.9 percent of the students were good, with only a tiny minority being anti-Part and antisocialist. These were the measures taken to calm the students. At the same time, they were extremely worred that the April 26 editorial might be overturned, and were especially afraid that I Would not support their actions upon my return. (Director of the United Front Work Department) Yan Mingfu reported to me that Li Peng had told him that if, upon my return, I did not support the April 26 editoriaL, Li would have no choice but to resign. Li Peng and (Politburo Standing Committee member) Yao Yiln colluded with each other to persuade me to express my support. They repeatedly requested that I add phrases such as "opposing turmoil" and "opposing bourgeois liberalization" into the speech I was preparing for the commemoration of the May Fourth Movement. When the draft was sent to them for comments, Li and Yao both requested the addition of remarks condemning bourgeois liberalization. Furthermore, because of the wide dissemination of Deng Xiaoping's remarks, Deng felt that his image among young people had been damaged. Deng Rong (Deng's daughter, also known as Maomao) told me through Bao Tong that references to Deng loving and protecting youths must be added to the speech. Under the circumstances, I did indeed decide to add to the speech one paragraph dedicated to how much Deng loved and protected youths. As soon as I had returned from North Korea, on the morning of April 30, Li Peng rushed over anxously to get me to call a meeting so I could listen to the report of the Beijing Part Committee. His goal was to pressure me to express support for the actions they had already taken. By May 1, at a gathering of Standing Committee members, I was already aware of thestTOng reactions against the April 26 editoriaL. However, since I myself stil knew very little about the actual situation and also to avoid a sudden reversal in policy, I did have to express some kind of approval of Li Peng's work, at least in some vague way. However, I emphasized that it was critical to win over the support of the mainstream. We had to distinguish the tiny minority from the mainstream, and not push the majority of people over to the opposing side. That is, we should not create a situation in which the bulk of the populace felt we were trying to repress them. No matter what the reason, we had to calmly acknowledge the fact that the view expressed by the April 26 editorial was widely divergent from the view held by the vast majority of people, especially students, intellectuals, and other political parties. I pointed out the need to conduct a wide range of dialogues. Not only should we meet with and seek the opinions of students, but also teachers and workers. As for the designation of the nature of the events, I emphasized that we could give new explanations that built upon the wording of the April 26 editorial, by indicating that only a tiny minority was .actually anti-Party, anti-socialist, and pushing for chaos. I hoped to mitigate the effects of the April 26 editorial. I also pointed out that we must advocate a return to classes because this was agreeable to the students' parents, their teachers, and most of society. So long as classes were resumed, the situation could be stabilzed and emotions would have a chance to cool down. Then all other matters could eventually be resolved. Once back from North Korea, I tried to garner information from all sides. I first called for the visual recordings of the demonstrations of April 27. On May 2, I responded to requests from leaders of other political parties-Fei Xiaotong, Sun Qimeng, and Lei Jieqiong-to convene a session to discuss the student demonstrations. On the morning of May 5, I asked the president of Peking University, Ding Shisun, and the vice president of Beijing Normal University, Xu Jialu, for a meeting. I asked them for a synopsis of the situation in their schools and for their assessments. In the afternoon, I invited myself to a discussion being held by the Central Committee of the China Democratic League for the university staff members within their organization. After gathering information and assessing the situation, I believed even more strongly that the student demonstrations had gained widespread sympathy from all comers of society and that the April 26 editorial and the way that the Central Committee had handled the demonstrations were in contradiction to the wishes of the people. If no measures were taken to ease the, tensions caused by the April 26 editorial, students would continue to fear that they were being threatened with retaliation, and tensions would continue unabated. I also felt that if the student demonstrations could be resolved along the principles of democracy and law, through dialogue and an easing of tensions, it could possibly boost China's reform, including political reform. On the other hand, if we were to suppress the demonstrations with violence, another Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign would be sure to follow, on an even larger scale than before. Conservatives would make a comeback and reform programs would come to a standstill or even be reversed. Chinese history would go through another period of zigzagging. The two approaches promised to result in two totally different outcomes. However, the crux of the issue was Deng Xiaoping himself. I hoped at the time that he could just relax things a little bit, for example, by saying something like "It seems that when Li Peng gave his report on April 25, we overreacted to the situation. It now appears that the student demonstrations are not such an overwhelming problem." With something like this to work with, I could turn the situation around without even putting any of the liabilty on Deng. The Politburo Standing Committee and I could take responsibilty. However, if Deng refused to relax his position, then there was no way for me to change the attitudes of the two hard-liners, Li Peng and Yao Yilin. If they did not change their view, it would be difficult for the Standing Committee to carry out the principles of reducing tensions and opening dialogue. I was very well aware that Deng had always taken a tough stance on these kinds of issues. In addition, he had been prejudiced by Li Peng's reports, so it would be extremely hard for me to make him change his position. I was eager to have a talk with Deng and to gain his support. I phoned (Deng's secretary) Wang Ruiln asking for a meeting with Deng, but Wang said Deng had not been feeling well lately and he worried that his health problems might make him unable to receive Gorbachev, which would be a serious matter indeed. So he asked that I not report anything to him at that time. To this day, I stil believe that what Wang said was the truth; Deng was indeed in bad health then. On May 2, I explained my idea to Yan Mingfu and asked him to contact Deng via Yang Shangkun and others who were closer to Deng. On May 3, I went to visit Yang Shangkun at his home. Yang said that he had already spoken with Wang Ruiln and Deng's children, and they believed it would be difficult to reverse the position taken in the April 26 editorial, but thought it could be downplayed by not mentioning it again while gradually turning away from it. They said that if I were to talk to Deng then, only to have him reaffirm his stand, it would make it even more difficult to turn things around in the future. Yang said, "Those of you who are in the front lines can turn things around gradually." Yang Shangkun also indicated that he could appeal to the other members of the Standing Committee. That same day, Yan Mingfu came by my home and told me that Wang Ruiln and Deng's children said that those in charge of the Central Committee should deal with the student movement as they saw fit, according to the situation. If we talked to Deng then, only to have him disagree, then we would only have made matters worse. In the days that followed, things progressed according to this idea of downplaying and gradually changing. My May Fourth speech was also based on this idea: the tone was distinctly different from the April 26 editorial, yet I used no phrasing that directly contradicted it. After the May Fourth speech, Yang Shangkun told me the result of his discussions with other members of the Politburo Standing Committee: Hu Qili and Qiao Shi agreed with the new approach; Li Peng and Yao Yilin opposed it. Comrade Wan Li, whom I spoke to directly, was in complete agreement with the new approach. This would mean that among the Standing Committee members and those who had attended the Standing Committee meeting, a majority supported me. Yang also told me that he had spoken with (influential Part elder) Peng Zhen, who was entirely supportive of my position. Peng told him that if Deng were later to look for someone to place the blame on, "Ziyang should not be left alone to bear the responsibilty," that he and Yang should also share responsibilty. This was his way of expressing his determination to support me. Before my return, when the Beijing Party Committee had proposed imposing martial law, Yang Shangkun had responded with sharp criticism: "How could we justify to the rest of the world imposing martial law on our capital?" I believe that Yang Shangkun held a moderate view toward the student demonstrations before Deng decided to impose martial law. On May 4, I delivered a speech to delegates of the Asian Development Bank regarding the student demonstrations. The speech was drafted by Bao Tong in accordance with my views. In this speech, I conveyed the need to resolve the matter in a cool, reasonable, restrained, and orderly manner based on the principles of democracy and law. I also pointed out that the student demonstrators had expresséd both approval of and dissatisfaction with the Part and the government, and that they were absolutely not against the basic foundations of our system. Instead they were merely asking us to correct some of our flaws. I also said that in demonstrations of this magnitude, one could not rule out the fact that some people might want to manipulate things according to their own interests, but that this would not result in a major upheaval in China. After that speech, positive responses were received from a wide range of sources, both domestic and overseas. After May 5 and in the days to follow, many universities in Beijing resumed classes. The director of the Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong, Xu Jiatun, who was then in Beijing, sent me a handwrtten note, in which he mentioned that when he had met with Yang Shangkun on May 4, Yang had expressed total agreement with my speech. At this time of widespread support, Li Peng came to my house on the evening of May 4 and was forced to commend me for my speech. He said he would follow up with some of the issues I'd mentioned when he himself met with delegates of the Asian Development Bank. But when I pointed out that the April 26 editorial was problematic, he disagreed. Because I could not meet with Deng himself, I discussed the matter with other comrades as mentioned above and attempted to turn the situation around gradually. Indeed, the situation was gradually turning around. When this approach was being taken, the situation became calmer and most of the students returned to their classes. However, they were waiting to see what happened next; that is, how the promises made in the May Fourth speech would be realized. I thought it best to use the time of relative calm to take active measures to set up dialogue with students and all other social groups, to respond to the issues of deepest concern to the students, and to adopt some of the students' reasonable ideas. These would have been concrete steps in the direction of opening dialogue and reducing tensions. While I and other members of the Politburo Standing Committee and those who had attended Standing Committee meetings were actively attempting to effect this turnaround, Li Peng and others in his group actively attempted to block, delay, and even sabotage the process, so that the proposed dialogue and methods to reduce tensions laid out in the May Fourth speech could not be carried out. Meanwhile, on the topics of most concern to people and raised by the students-such as corruption, government transparency, democracy, rule of law, and public scrutiny of government-we needed to take active measures. I suggested establishing a Commission Against Corrption with real authority, under the National People's Congress (NPC) , that would independently accept reports and conduct investigations into the unlawful activities of familes of senior Part leaders; strengthening the public's abilty to scrutinize the government; increasing government transparency and speeding up the process of establishing laws on the press and demonstrations; and adopting the practice common around the world of protecting the people's democratic rights by establishing specific laws. I further proposed callng a meeting of the NPC Standing Committee to conduct public hearings on the auditing of several major corporations that were commonly believed to be plagued by corruption. All the arrangements and further investigations should be managed by the NPC, because in the minds of many people, the NPC was more transparent than the Party or the government. My general approach was thus to carry out reform in the areas of concern to the people, so that we could reduce the level of dissatisfaction among the people and the students, so as to reduce and end the student demonstrations, and at the same time we could seize the opportunity to boost political reform. Tackling these specific issues would enable the NPC to play its rightful role as the highest authority in the nation while directing the students' attention toward furthering political reform. On May 13, when Yang Shangkun and I went to Oeng Xiaoping's residence to discuss issues pertaining to Gorbachev's forthcoming visit, I also talked to him about the recent situation with the student demonstrations. I expressed my views about open dialogue, tackling corruption, and transparency. In principle he agreed, and said that there was "a need to take the opportunity to tackle corruption, to make a concerted effort." He also mentioned that there was a need for increased transparency. There had been many rumors circulating about the sons and daughters of senior leaders doing business by taking advantage of official government resources. Many of these rumors accused my own sons and daughters. Because of this, on the afternoon of May 1, I proposed at a Politburo Standing Committee meeting that the Politburo order the Central Discipline Correction Commission and the Ministry of Supervision to open an investigation of my family members. Later I sent a formal letter to the Politburo to request that it support my proposal. Another issue that the students cared about was press freedom. On May 6, in a discussion about reforming press policy with comrades (PSC member) Hu Qili and (Central Committee Secretariat member) Rui Xingwen, I proposed that attention be paid when drafting new press laws to relaxing the restrictions on news reporting, editorials, and commentary. On May 3, I went to (NPC Standing Committee chairman) Wan Li's home and talked with him about the student demonstrations. I commented that some of the leadership had overreacted to the student demonstrations, a result mainly of an outdated mentality formed by the prolonged focus on class struggle. Times had changed, and we needed to change this mentality to coincide with the trend of democracy and rule of law. He completely agreed with me, and said that many leaders from Tianjin and Beijing had complained to him that the Central Committee had been too soft on the student demonstrations, another example of this kind of old mentality at work. He also suggested that these problems needed to be resolved. Either during the Politburo Standing Committee meeting of May 8 or the Politburo meeting of May 10 (I don't remember which), he (Wan Li), made some very good suggestions about following the worldwide trend toward democracy and properly addressing the issues that the students had taken up in their demonstrations. He expressed his full support of my Politburo proposal when he held the NPC Standing Committee meeting. He also set a date for another meeting of the NPC Standing Committee, to be held soon, and listed these issues on the meeting's agenda. On May 9, Wan Li came to my house to tell me he was about to leave for an official visit to Canada and the United States. He had thought about speaking to Deng Xiaoping about the issue before leaving, but had not found the time to do so. On several occasions while in Canada and the United States, he called the student movement both patriotic and democratic, praising it highly. The attitude that Wan Li adopted toward the student demonstrations was no accident. He had always believed in opening up to democracy and had always supported political reform. He had been opposed to the Anti-Liberalization Campaign of 1987 and had given speeches specifically about the democratization of decision making. Among senior leaders of the Central Committee, he was the one who most ardently supported reform. Li Peng, Yao Yilin, and Beijing Municipality (Part Secretary) Li Ximing made fierce attempts to block, resist, and delay the carring out of my proposals. They did not openly express opposition to my May Fourth speech in the few days following, and even voiced a few words of praise. But in factthey were working furiously to distort it. They claimed that my speech was actually in line with their April 26 editorial but had just taken a slightly different angle. They then asked (State Education Commission Vice Minister) He Dongchang to spread a notion at a meeting held by the State Council with several university Part chiefs that Zhao's speech represented only his personal opinion and did not represent the Central Committee's. This message was quickly spread among the students. They attempted even more furiously to resist and to delay any dialogue with the students. Originally the idea of the dialogue was to meet directly with the student demonstrators, but they not only denied the participation of any student organizations that had emerged during the demonstrations, they also prohibited the students from selècting their own representatives. They insisted on letting only students from official student organizations partcipate, which could not in any way have been representative of the student demonstrators. Wasn't conducting dialogue in this manner the same as completely rejecting dialoguè altogether? Also, when they did hold dialogues, they did not discuss things openly or seek diverse opinions with an attitude of sincerity. Instead they were merely paying lip service, in the same way that they had always handled foreign reporters at press conferences, presenting an image that would benefit themselves politically. This left the students with the impression that the government's offer to hold dialogues with them was totally insincere. I repeatedly criticized this behavior, but was ignored. On efforts to fight corruption and increase transparency, they were even more remiss. Li Peng even opposed listing these issues on the agenda of the NPC Standing Committee meeting. He called me specifically to object to putting these items on the agenda. Because of that, after students had returned to their classes and several days had passed, they could not see how the government was taking any real actions. The .dialogues that took place seemed aimed only at brushing them off, and of course no concrete steps were taken on reform; so in fact, doubts grew about my May Fourth speech. A more intense confrontation was therefore made inevitable. Now we must answer the question "Why did the student movement continue for such a long time?" They claim that my May Fourth speech had revealed a rift within the Central Committee, into the so-called "two voices." That is not true! The real reason was that the guidelines laid out after my return from North Korea-namely to defuse tensions, to open dialogue, to resolve the issue through democracy and law, and to start tackling hot issues by proceeding with political reform-had been blocked, resisted, and sabotaged by Li Peng and his associates. Just before Gorbachev's arrval, Li Peng said to me, "You're not going to continue to use soft measures to deal with the student demonstrations, are you? After so much time has elapsed, haven't they already been proven useless?" This comment fully revealed his hidden ill intentions. He used resistance and sabotage to ensure that efforts to resolve the student demonstrations on the basis of democracy and law would fail, with the intention of looking for an excuse to crush the student demonstrations using violent means. An incident at the World Economic Herald in Shanghai also happened during my visit to North Korea. It started when the newspaper printed a report on the activities commemorating Hu Yaobang. The Shanghai Part Committee found the content inappropriate and ordered the paper to cut the report, but it refused to do so. The Shanghai Part Committee therefore decided to close down the paper for reorganization and suspended the chief editor, Qin Benli. According to what I heard, (Shanghai Part chief) Jiang Zemin had phoned the office of Deng Xiaoping for a directive on handling this. The students and the masses were in a highly charged emotional state then. By doing what it did, it (the Shanghai Part Committee) not only angered the Herald's staff, but also provoked general opposition. from the staff at other news agencies in Beijing, Shanghai, and other places around the country. Many (members of these staffs) took to the streets to voice their support of the Herald and demanded that the Shanghai Part Committee reverse its decision against the Herald. Their actions coincided with the student demonstrations and the two groups mutually reinforced one another. When I'd returned to the country, I felt the Shanghai Part Committee had been too rigid and simplistic in dealing with the issue and had also chosen a bad time to do it. But since the matter had already passed, I didn't comment on it; it seemed inappropriate for me to admonish the Shanghai Party Committee and side with the staff of the news organization. The Central Committee therefore took the position of not intervening, allowing the Shanghai Part Committee to resolve the issue itself. On May 2, when I was holding a talk with members of other political parties, Yan Mingfu reported that someone representing the local Shanghai United Front Work Department had told him that the Shanghai Party Committee wanted to back down from its previous position. They hoped the Central United Front Work Department would assist them. I replied, "Since the Shanghai Party Committee has made such a request, you should help them find a solution." On May 10, Jiang Zemin came to Beijing and talked to me about plans to reduce tensions. I told him the matter should be resolved in Shanghai without the interference of the Central Committee, thereby avoiding creating suspicion that the Shanghai government was merely bowing to pressure from the Central Committee. Jiang Zemin was unhappy about this, and after June Fourth, listed this incident as one of the accusations against me.

[ 本帖最后由 真理社妓者 于 2009-5-29 15:05 编辑 ]

https://docs.google.com/Doc?id=d ... dent_Protests_Begin PART 1: THE TIANANMEN MASSACRE 1: The Student Protests Begin The student movement of 1989 is one of the defining moments of Zhao Ziyang's career. On April 15, news of the death of Hu Yaobang, the liberal reformer who had been ousted from his position as Communist Party General Secretary two years earlier, sets off an outpouring of public mourning by college students in Beijing. It is a clear act of defiance against the decision made by paramount leader Deng Xiaoping and other Party elders to expel Hu. The protests come at a time when China's citizens are already worried about rising prices and growing corruption in the country's half-reformed economy. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Chinese join in the demonstrations. The Communist Party leadership is split. The conservatives who had supported the toppling of Hu argue for a crackdown. But Zhao, who had succeeded Hu as Party chief, worries about the political consequences of a server response, and that a hard-line backlash could derail economic reforms. As the protests drag on, the power struggle intensifies. Soon after the protests erupt, however, Zhao is due to travel to North Korea on an official visit, which limits his ability to influence the Party's response to the demonstrations. While he is away, on April 26, the government authorizes publication of an official verdict on the protests, in the foorm of an editorial in the People's Daily. Its strident tone only makes things worse and diminishes Zhao's ability to manage the situation. Here Zhao speaks in depth for the first time about the source of the protests. He explains why he felt they didn't pose a direct threat to the government and how they could have been resolved long before the violent suppression of June 4. Seven years ago [in 1992], I jotted down some notes about the events surrounding the June Fourth incident because I was worried that I might start forgetting some of the specifics. I hoped that it might serve as a hind of historical record. Now I will talk about the incident according to these notes. Some of these issues were covered in the speech I delivered at the Fourth Plenum of the 13th Central Committee [held June 23-24, 1989, when Zhao, outsed from power, defended his role during the protests], but there are also oother issues that I did not mention then. I will now talk about all of them. First, I would like to talk about what initially triggered the student protests. All of the early incidences of student protests were related to the commemoration of [Hu] Yaobang. Yaobang died on April 15, 1989. Immediately after the announcement was broadcast, some college students initiated commemoration activities. Soon thereafter, they took their activities onto the streets, and the number of participants grew and grew. Though at this point some students made some extreme statements because of piqued emotions, overall their activities were fairly orderly and nothing excessive took place. On the nights of April 18 and 19, several hundred people gathered outside Xinhua Gate [outside the Party's headquarters]. I later called for and watched the video recordings made by the Ministry of Public Security. In the so-called "incident of students besieging Xinhua Gate," some of the students in the front were in fact shouting repeatedly, "We must maintain order! Don't do anything out of line" There was a large crowd of spectators behind them. The students made verbal demands, including demands to meet certain members of the leadership. Then people pushed from behind and it got a little bit chaotic. The students then organized a team to act as guards to keep back the crowd of spectators. On April 22, while the officlal memorial service for Hu Yaobang was taking place, tens of thousands of students were assembled in Tiananmen Square. This had been officially approved. The loudspeakers in the square broadcast the audio from the official memorial service inside the Great Hall of the People, so they could all listen in. This was the situation before the publishing of the April 26 editorial in the People's Daily. Why did the students react so strongly in commemorating the passing of Hu Yaobang? The reasons were complicated. First, Hu Yaobang had always had a very good public image. He was responsible for reversing numerous cases of unjustified persecutions following the Mao years; he had always been a proponent of reform; most important, he was incorruptible while in power. There was a lot of dissatisfaction with corruption back then, so commemorating Hu Yaobang provided a chance to express this discontent. Second, many people were displeased or even outraged by Hu Yaobang's demotion in 1987. Many people were averse to the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign [launched in 1987] and continued to be opposed to it. In addition, people found unacceptable the way in which the leadership was changed. In general, people were expressing a felling of indignation over how Hu Yaobang had been treated. Third, when the government's reorganization was proposed in the fall of 1988, programs for reform had been cut back on all fronts. No action had been taken on political reform while economic reform had been brought to a standstill or even retracted. Students were dissatified with the general situation and were expressing their desire for advancing reforms through their commemoration of Hu Yaobang. There were three kinds of people who took to the streets to protest: the vast majority of people belonged to the category I described above. There were also those who held grievances against our past policies and were taking the opportunity to make some noise. Of course, there was also a small number of people who opposed the Part and opposed socialism that were hoping to aggravate the situation. At a Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) meeting (the date is unclear), I said that we should not forbid the activities of the students who were merely holding their own commemorations while the Central Committee was holding memorial services. There was no reason why we should reserve for ourselves exclusive rights to commemorate Hu, while forbidding the students to do so. I suggested we punish according to law only those who engaged in the five type of behaviors: beating, smashing, looting, burning, or trespassing. In all other normal circumstances, there should be an attempt to reduce tensions. After the official memorial service for Hu Yaobang, I proposed a course of action with three points: 1.With the memorial service now over, social activities should return to normaL. Students need to be persuaded to discontinue their street demonstrations and return to their classes. (At the time, I felt that whatever their motives, the students had in fact engaged in nothing more than commemorating Hu Yaobang. So with the memorial service over, and their having had a chance to. participate by holding their own activities, there should have been no reason to continue the demonstration"s. It was time to return to classes.) 2. According to the principal goal of reducing tensions, dialogue should be conducted at multiple levels, and through various channels and formats to establish mutual understanding and to seek a variety of opinions. Whatever opinions they held, all students, teachers, and intellectuals should be allowed to express themselves freely. 3. Bloodshed must be avoided, no matter what. However, those who engaged in the five kinds of behavior-beating, smashing, looting, burning, and trespassing-should be punished according to law. My suggestions were all accepted by (Premier) Li Peng and every member of the Politburo Standing Committee and were officially documented. The above assessment of the situation and the principles for action agreed upon were disseminated via varous channels to local government branches. These were the three points that I proposed before my visit to North Korea. I spoke to key leaders of the Central Committee about them while taking the elevator down after the memorial service, and later expressed them again formally. On the afternoon of Apri 23, as I was preparing to leave Beijing train station to head for North Korea, Li Peng came to send me off. He asked me if I had anything further to add. I said that my position had been summarized in those three points. I later heard that Li Peng reported the three points to Deng Xiaoping, who also expressed his agreement. There were no disagreements from members of the Politburo Standing Committee, at least not openly. I can remember only one: on the evening of April 19, Li Peng called me unexpectedly and demanded accusingly, "The students are trying to break into Xinhua Gate! Why aren't any counteractions being taken?" I told him that (PSC member in charge of security) Qiao Shi was immediately responsible, and that he should be able to take care of any urgent situation that might arise using existing emergency plans. I later informed Qiao Shi of Li Peng's call. In fact, by the morning of the 20th, most of the students had already left Xinhua Gate. The few who remained were cleared away by the police. They were ordered onto buses that drove them back to their schools. This was the situation of the student demonstrations before I visited North Korea, and the policy of the Standing Committee at that time. [ 本帖最后由 真理社妓者 于 2009-5-29 15:07 编辑 ]