09年5月29日 15:06
https://docs.google.com/Doc?id=d ... _Makes_Things_Worse The Communist Party leadership doesn't know how to respond to the growing student protest. When Zhao leaves on his trip to North Korea, hard-liners opposed to his reforms take advantage of his absence and maneuver supreme leader Deng Xiaoping to their side, leading him to angrily denounce the demonstrations. Any hope of calming things down is lost on April 26, when the Party issues its official verdict on the protests in an editorial in the People's Daily that reports Deng's harsh words. Deng is shocked to learn that his comments have been published, but withdrawing the piece would imply that China's supreme leader had made a mistake, a path the Party doesn't wish to risk. The Party and the protesters are now locked on a collision course. Zhao has failed to sense the danger before leaving for Pyongyang. So why did the student demonstrations later turn into such a mess? The crux of the situation was the April 26 editorial. The students had feelings of dissatisfaction that, one way or the other, they were going to express. If they had not held demonstrations then, they would have held them later. They were truly discontented! However, the scale of the demonstrations, the mess it turned into, and why it happened when it did were all the results of the April 26 editorial. The situation before the publication of the editorial and the situation afterward were different. If the right measures had been taken to direct the situation, then there would not have been such dire results. I visited Deng Xiaoping on April 19 to discuss my Nort Korea trip, to talk to him about the student demonstrations, and to give him my views on how the situation should be handled. At the time, Deng had expressed support for me. Yet things took a strange turn after that. The very evening of the day that I left Beijing, Li Ximing and Chen Xitong of the Beijing Part Committee asked (chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee) Wan Li to call a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee to listen to their report. Wan Li fell for their trick. (Wan Li and I had been in total agreement in our view of the student protests.) Wan Li directed their request to Li Peng, as Li Peng was temporarily in charge of Standing Committee* activities while I was abroad. The very next evening, Li Peng called for a Standing Committee meeting. * The author often shortens "Politburo Standing Committee" to "Standing Committee". With Li Peng presiding, Li Ximing and Chen Xitong vigorously presented the student demonstrations as a grave situation. They disregarded the fact that the student demonstrations had already calmed down. In fact, student opinions had begun diverging. Some of the students believed that they should resume classes and had already done so, while a minority opposed the return to classes. Internal friction had become apparent in some schools. Some of the students had attempted to resume classes, while other, more extreme students had blocked the entrances to the classrooms to prevent them from entering. This shows that for some students, the activities had not fully satisfied their need to vent their anger. If measures were to be taken to reduce tensions, to have dialogue, and to allow students the chance to propose certain reasonable requests, this was a good time to do so. However, in their report, they (Li Ximing and Chen Xitong) went so far as to state, "Nationwide, large-scale demonstrations including the participation of high school students and workers are being organized and are fomenting." They also reported that "university students in Beijing have sent contacts to places around the country and have conducted fund-raising in the streets to prepare for activities on a larger scale." They denounced the extreme opinions of a few students, especially remarks directed specifically at Deng Xiaoping. They presented the demonstrations as opposing the Communist Part and targeting Deng Xiaoping personally. With the onset of reform, students, especially college students, had been exposed to many Western ways. Remarks critical of political leaders were made casually and considered inconsequential; the intense climate (of fear) that existed during the Cultural Revolution* and before no longer existed. Many of these student remarks targeted me, such as those that accused my children of making business deals utilzing official resources or those that claimed that trainloads of fertilzer had been sent to my hometown. * The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a period of great upheaval in China that lasted from 1966 to 1976. Launched by Chairman Mao Zedong, who was frustrated by the passive resistance of his own bureaucracy to his radical economic policies, the ultraleftist campaign led to the persecution of milions, including purges of hundreds of thousands of Communist Part officials. With hundreds of thousands of people involved, it's impossible for there to have been no extreme or one-sided comments. Things appear extremely grave if you select only the ten most extreme statements being expressed by all of the people involved. I am not sure what was behind Li Ximing and Chen Xitong's behavior: either their old mentality of class struggle was at work or they had other ulterior motives. The student demonstration was deemed an "organized and carefully plotted political struggle," and was documented as such in the minutes of the meeting. Li Peng, Li Ximing, and Chen Xitong were the ones initially responsible for this. On April 25, Li Peng and (President) Yang Shangkun reported to Deng Xiaoping about the Politburo Standing Committee meeting. Deng Xiaoping had always tended to prefer tough measures when dealing with student demonstrations because he believed that demonstrations undermined stabilty. After listening to their report, Deng immediately agreed to label the student demonstrations "anti-Part, anti-socialist turmoil" and proposed to resolve the situation quickly, in the manner of "using a sharp knife to cut through knotted hemp." When I had visited him on April i 9, he had agreed with my position. On 'the 25th, after being briefed by Li Peng and Yang Shangkun, he had changed his mind to agree with their assessment. After all, it coincided more closely with what he had really believed all along. Deng's discussion with Li Peng and others on April 25 was supposed to be an internal affair. However, Li Peng decided to disseminate the contents of Deng's remarks that very evening to Part cadres of all levels, and paraphrased their talk in the editorial that he had the People's Daily publish on April 26, publicly designating the student demonstrations as "premeditated and organized turmoil with anti-Part and anti-socialist motives." Before my visit to North Korea, neither Li Peng nor the cadres in Beijing mentioned these viewpoints to me. Immediately upon my leaving Beijing, they quickly held a Politburo Standing Committee meeting and gained support from Oeng Xiaoping. This constituted a departure from the previous position and the principles adopted by the Standing Committee. Deng was not happy about how Li Peng had made his remarks public. Deng's children were also displeased that Deng had been put in the position of being in direct confrontation with the public. As I was preparing a speech for the commemoration of the May Fourth Movement, * (Deng's daughter) Maomao called (Zhao adviser) Bao Tong, who was drafting the text, to suggest that the speech include remarks about how much Deng loved and protected young people. * The May Fourth Movement is the name given to nationwide demonstrations staged in 1919 that were provoked by the Treaty of Versailes, which was perceived as unfair to China. The demonstrtions marked the shiftng of the modern Chinese intellectual movement away from Western liberalism, toward the ideals of the Russian Revolution. China's Communist Part identifies the movement as its intellectual origin. Later, on May 17, at the meeting at Deng's home in which the decision was made to impose martial law, Deng demanded of Li Peng, "Don't repeat what you did before; don't reveal that it was I who made the decision to impose martial law!" Li Peng said repeatedly, "I won't! I won't!" It was obvious that some people were attempting to use the extreme words of a few students to aggravate the situation and push the government to the point of direct confrontation. With the implementation of reform, it should not have been such a big deal that students criticized leaders. They were just expressions of frustration and were not a challenge to our entire political system. However, selectively gathering all the personal criticisms and reading them aloud to Deng made for a tremendous insult to the old man. These people selected sporadic extreme opinions of a tiny minority of students and represented them as the major trend of the movement, which they claimed was directed specifically against Deng Xiaoping himself. Deng tended to think in a certain way that was formed during the years when class struggle was the primary objective, so as soon as he heard Li Peng's report, he reacted accordingly. I am afraid this is one of the major reasons for his decision. While I was in North Korea, the minutes of the Standing Committee meeting of April 24 and Deng Xiaoping's remarks reached me through the embassy. I replied by telegram: "I completely agree with Comrade Deng Xiaoping's decision regarding the policy toward the current turmoil." When I received these documents, I had to respond, and I was not in any position to express disagreement because I was abroad and had no direct knowledge of the situation at home. However, I did not express my views on the minutes of the Standing Committee meeting. Upon reading Oeng Xiaoping's remarks, I did not think that any immediate actions would be taken against the students. My first thought was that another campaign against liberalism might begin, possibly on an even greater scale than before (it hadn't occurred to me that the student protests would not subside, because I had not thought of them as a major problem). (A new campaign could) damage the momentum that the reforms had gained since the 13th Part Congress (held in OctoberlNovember i 987) especially in political reform. That's because Deng believed that the student demonstrations were the long-term results of the lax execution of the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign. However, after the publication of the April 26 editoriaL, the situation immediately changed, and the confrontation escalated. Students were angered by the editorial's wording and political accusations. "Anti-Part," "anti-socialist," "premeditated plot," etc., were terms that had not been heard in years, so they provoked intense emotions. Those who were moderate before were then forced to take sides with the extremists. After I returned from North Korea, I invited several people from universities over for discussions. Ali of them talked about this situation. Upon the publishing of the April 26 editorial, many people were highly displeased, including those in various government departments. Many exclaimed, "How did we end up with that thing?!" The number of demonstrators on the streets on April 27 had swelled to ten thousand. The harsh words of the editorial made students feel that their actions might lead to a crackdown. Some even left wils and letters of farewell for their familes before taking to the streets. The April 26 editorial not only agitated the students, but also left those in various government departments, organizations, and other political parties in a general state of discontent. They found it incomprehensible and were displeased or even angered by it. They believed that the students had acted out of a sincere concern for important matters of state and the fate of reforms, and had expressed their views on some hot social issues, all out of goodwil and patriotism. The government not only failed to express support or provide guidance, but with the harshly worded editorial took a stand in opposition to the students, labeling them with the political tags "anti-Part" and "anti-socialist." The reaction from intellectuals was especially critical. The government's response boosted popular sympathy and support for the students. Video recordings showed that wherever the students went, crowds lining their passage applauded and welcomed them. Some even joined in the protests. Even the police who had lined up to form a blockade made only superfcial attempts to stop them, and then let everyone pass. Some of the prepared roadblocks were opened up as soon as the students arrived, as if they'd never meant to stop them in the first place. Many senior cadres grew quite worred about the student demonstrations. After Deng Xiaoping's remarks, they were afraid that the escalating confrontation would result in bloodshed. Again and again, they warned the Central Committee to show restraint and to avoid using force. (Influential Part elder) Peng Zhen phoned the Central Committee's General Office directly several times to say that under no circumstances should force be used. He hoped the Central Committee would not aggavate tensions. One exception was (Part elder and chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) Li Xiannian, who after hearing Deng's remarks, phoned Deng and said, "We must make the decision and be prepared to arrest hundreds of thousands of people!" I admit I can't attest to the accuracy of this. (Another Part elder and vice president of China) Wang Zhen also proposed arresting more people. Faced with tens of thousands of demonstrators and the entreaties of all these senior cadres, those who had been determined to quell the demonstrations, such as the Beijing Part Committee and Li Peng, were suddenly at a loss as to how to proceed. This was certainly a positive thing. The students had anticipated a crackdown, but when it didn't happen they returned to their schools celebrating their victory and were left feeling more encouraged and fearless than ever. Because Deng's remarks had been sent to school administrations and the editorial had been published, many members of Part organizations, university presidents, and teachers had initially made intensive efforts to prevent students from taking part in the demonstrations, pleading with them not to take to the streets. When the students returned unharmed, these people felt humiliated. They did not like feeling that they had been misled. They had put themselves out for nothing. (Beijing mayor) Chen Xitong and many others like him shared this feeling. At the Politburo Standing Committee meeting on May 1, Chen Xitong was full of anger as he presented his report from the Beijing Part Committee. He said that the school officials all feltas though they'd been "sold out." I condemned his remarks and asked him, "Who has sold out whom?" The large-scale demonstrations of April 27 made a few things clear. The original intention of the April 26 editorial's designàtions "anti-Party, anti-socialist" was to deter the students. The result, however, was the opposite: the demonstrations had grown bigger. This showed that the old ways of political labeling that had worked before were no longer effective. Second, since Deng Xiaoping's internal remarks of April 25 had been disseminated widely, the students were aware that Deng was in support of the editorial. They went out to protest anyway, proving that even the symbol of the paramount leader had lost its effectiveness. Third, the Beijing Municipal Government had just announced a new regulation for demonstrations that imposed strict limits and countermeasures, but this had also been ignored, making the new regulation as good as a piece of wastepaper. Even the police blockades had failed. Once I'd grasped the circumstances after my return to Beijing, I realized that if the situation were to continue without a reduction in tensions, a violent solution was almost a certainty. The situation now was entirely different from what it was before April 27, because the students had grown fearless. They believed that the government had already used all the means at its disposal, all of which had proven ineffective, leaving only the mobilzation of the miltary. Yet the students could not imagine that the government would actually mobilze the army against them. When I passed through (the northeast city of) Shenyang on my way back from North Korea, I was given a report on the responses of Shenyang officials to Deng Xiaoping's remarks. They had expressed doubts: "Can measures of this kind still be used?" They told me that many people were critical of Deng after hearing his remarks. Hence, upon my return from North Korea, the situation had grown perilous. Large-scale bloodshed had become all too possible.
评论于：Prisoner of the State
09年5月29日 14:48
[ 本帖最后由 真理社妓者 于 2009-5-29 15:05 编辑 ]
评论于：Prisoner of the State
09年5月27日 11:11
https://docs.google.com/View?id=dcfq7dp8_162563p48hk
评论于：因邓玉娇抗暴和周老虎案件 中科院研究员提请国家总理辞职
09年5月26日 09:14
20090526 美议长访华 数千人伸冤 堵北京马路高喊「还我人权」 https://docs.google.com/View?id=dcfq7dp8_1327q3tk7c4
评论于：佩洛西访华，北京南站暴动
09年5月26日 08:59
【明報專訊】臨近陆肆 ，北京 爆發近年最大規模的抗議活動。來自全國各地約千名上訪者昨日上午突然聚集在最高法院信訪接待室外抗議示威，部分人更躺在馬路上，造成附近交通堵塞近2小時，大批公安到場拉起警戒線，但大多數上訪者在中午時分和平離去，其間並無發生嚴重衝突。暫時未知這次大規模抗議活動是否有人在幕後組織。 據悉，訪民最早在昨日上午9時許開始在此聚集。由於長期關注中國人權的美國 眾議院議長佩洛西從上海 轉抵北京繼續訪華行程，因此，有抗議者拉起「歡迎佩洛西訪華、關注中國人權SOS」的橫額，從行人路衝到馬路上，並高喊「打倒腐敗、還我人權」口號及拋灑傳單。公安趕到現場欲上前搶走橫額，隨即遇到大批訪民起哄。 呼籲訪華美議長關注人權 附近居民向本報表示，不少上訪者在馬路上靜坐或躺臥，「多數都是六、七十歲的老太太，警察也沒法抓，後來又來了兩三百個警察，還拉了警戒線，就開始趕人。」該居民透露，前兩天也有訪民示威鬧事，昨日的規模最大，最多時約有近千人，但並無爆發嚴重衝突。由於事發地點位於最高法院信訪接待室附近，這裏也是北京南站（火車站）對開、南二環路旁的交通要道，因此造成嚴重交通阻塞。 這些上訪者來自全國各地，訴求並不相同，但不願說出是否有人通知他們到場聚集。人群中有人手持傳單、有人身穿寫有「冤」字的白色T恤，「我丈夫為了保護人民的土地，被人殺害了，3個人殺的。現在他們派人死管着我，不幫我解決。」一名年約50多歲的婦女稱，自己上訪多年，一直不獲處理。來自河北滄州的張樹榮說，堵路也是無可奈何，「本來到這裏（信訪室）來就是抱着一線希望，但還是推來推去。」他由於一次醫療事故而造成腎出血，認為醫院處理不公，政府又包庇醫院。 外國記者採訪被帶走 有外國傳媒在10時許收到消息後趕到，有互聯網消息指，有1名外國記者被帶走問話，但很快獲釋。近中午12時，警方將訪民趕離馬路，並帶走數人問話，交通恢復正常，但仍有逾百人分散在附近路邊、綠化帶躺坐，並未離去。
评论于：佩洛西访华，北京南站暴动
09年5月24日 12:44
https://docs.google.com/Doc?id=d ... dent_Protests_Begin PART 1: THE TIANANMEN MASSACRE 1: The Student Protests Begin The student movement of 1989 is one of the defining moments of Zhao Ziyang's career. On April 15, news of the death of Hu Yaobang, the liberal reformer who had been ousted from his position as Communist Party General Secretary two years earlier, sets off an outpouring of public mourning by college students in Beijing. It is a clear act of defiance against the decision made by paramount leader Deng Xiaoping and other Party elders to expel Hu. The protests come at a time when China's citizens are already worried about rising prices and growing corruption in the country's half-reformed economy. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Chinese join in the demonstrations. The Communist Party leadership is split. The conservatives who had supported the toppling of Hu argue for a crackdown. But Zhao, who had succeeded Hu as Party chief, worries about the political consequences of a server response, and that a hard-line backlash could derail economic reforms. As the protests drag on, the power struggle intensifies. Soon after the protests erupt, however, Zhao is due to travel to North Korea on an official visit, which limits his ability to influence the Party's response to the demonstrations. While he is away, on April 26, the government authorizes publication of an official verdict on the protests, in the foorm of an editorial in the People's Daily. Its strident tone only makes things worse and diminishes Zhao's ability to manage the situation. Here Zhao speaks in depth for the first time about the source of the protests. He explains why he felt they didn't pose a direct threat to the government and how they could have been resolved long before the violent suppression of June 4. Seven years ago [in 1992], I jotted down some notes about the events surrounding the June Fourth incident because I was worried that I might start forgetting some of the specifics. I hoped that it might serve as a hind of historical record. Now I will talk about the incident according to these notes. Some of these issues were covered in the speech I delivered at the Fourth Plenum of the 13th Central Committee [held June 23-24, 1989, when Zhao, outsed from power, defended his role during the protests], but there are also oother issues that I did not mention then. I will now talk about all of them. First, I would like to talk about what initially triggered the student protests. All of the early incidences of student protests were related to the commemoration of [Hu] Yaobang. Yaobang died on April 15, 1989. Immediately after the announcement was broadcast, some college students initiated commemoration activities. Soon thereafter, they took their activities onto the streets, and the number of participants grew and grew. Though at this point some students made some extreme statements because of piqued emotions, overall their activities were fairly orderly and nothing excessive took place. On the nights of April 18 and 19, several hundred people gathered outside Xinhua Gate [outside the Party's headquarters]. I later called for and watched the video recordings made by the Ministry of Public Security. In the so-called "incident of students besieging Xinhua Gate," some of the students in the front were in fact shouting repeatedly, "We must maintain order! Don't do anything out of line" There was a large crowd of spectators behind them. The students made verbal demands, including demands to meet certain members of the leadership. Then people pushed from behind and it got a little bit chaotic. The students then organized a team to act as guards to keep back the crowd of spectators. On April 22, while the officlal memorial service for Hu Yaobang was taking place, tens of thousands of students were assembled in Tiananmen Square. This had been officially approved. The loudspeakers in the square broadcast the audio from the official memorial service inside the Great Hall of the People, so they could all listen in. This was the situation before the publishing of the April 26 editorial in the People's Daily. Why did the students react so strongly in commemorating the passing of Hu Yaobang? The reasons were complicated. First, Hu Yaobang had always had a very good public image. He was responsible for reversing numerous cases of unjustified persecutions following the Mao years; he had always been a proponent of reform; most important, he was incorruptible while in power. There was a lot of dissatisfaction with corruption back then, so commemorating Hu Yaobang provided a chance to express this discontent. Second, many people were displeased or even outraged by Hu Yaobang's demotion in 1987. Many people were averse to the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign [launched in 1987] and continued to be opposed to it. In addition, people found unacceptable the way in which the leadership was changed. In general, people were expressing a felling of indignation over how Hu Yaobang had been treated. Third, when the government's reorganization was proposed in the fall of 1988, programs for reform had been cut back on all fronts. No action had been taken on political reform while economic reform had been brought to a standstill or even retracted. Students were dissatified with the general situation and were expressing their desire for advancing reforms through their commemoration of Hu Yaobang. There were three kinds of people who took to the streets to protest: the vast majority of people belonged to the category I described above. There were also those who held grievances against our past policies and were taking the opportunity to make some noise. Of course, there was also a small number of people who opposed the Part and opposed socialism that were hoping to aggravate the situation. At a Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) meeting (the date is unclear), I said that we should not forbid the activities of the students who were merely holding their own commemorations while the Central Committee was holding memorial services. There was no reason why we should reserve for ourselves exclusive rights to commemorate Hu, while forbidding the students to do so. I suggested we punish according to law only those who engaged in the five type of behaviors: beating, smashing, looting, burning, or trespassing. In all other normal circumstances, there should be an attempt to reduce tensions. After the official memorial service for Hu Yaobang, I proposed a course of action with three points: 1.With the memorial service now over, social activities should return to normaL. Students need to be persuaded to discontinue their street demonstrations and return to their classes. (At the time, I felt that whatever their motives, the students had in fact engaged in nothing more than commemorating Hu Yaobang. So with the memorial service over, and their having had a chance to. participate by holding their own activities, there should have been no reason to continue the demonstration"s. It was time to return to classes.) 2. According to the principal goal of reducing tensions, dialogue should be conducted at multiple levels, and through various channels and formats to establish mutual understanding and to seek a variety of opinions. Whatever opinions they held, all students, teachers, and intellectuals should be allowed to express themselves freely. 3. Bloodshed must be avoided, no matter what. However, those who engaged in the five kinds of behavior-beating, smashing, looting, burning, and trespassing-should be punished according to law. My suggestions were all accepted by (Premier) Li Peng and every member of the Politburo Standing Committee and were officially documented. The above assessment of the situation and the principles for action agreed upon were disseminated via varous channels to local government branches. These were the three points that I proposed before my visit to North Korea. I spoke to key leaders of the Central Committee about them while taking the elevator down after the memorial service, and later expressed them again formally. On the afternoon of Apri 23, as I was preparing to leave Beijing train station to head for North Korea, Li Peng came to send me off. He asked me if I had anything further to add. I said that my position had been summarized in those three points. I later heard that Li Peng reported the three points to Deng Xiaoping, who also expressed his agreement. There were no disagreements from members of the Politburo Standing Committee, at least not openly. I can remember only one: on the evening of April 19, Li Peng called me unexpectedly and demanded accusingly, "The students are trying to break into Xinhua Gate! Why aren't any counteractions being taken?" I told him that (PSC member in charge of security) Qiao Shi was immediately responsible, and that he should be able to take care of any urgent situation that might arise using existing emergency plans. I later informed Qiao Shi of Li Peng's call. In fact, by the morning of the 20th, most of the students had already left Xinhua Gate. The few who remained were cleared away by the police. They were ordered onto buses that drove them back to their schools. This was the situation of the student demonstrations before I visited North Korea, and the policy of the Standing Committee at that time. [ 本帖最后由 真理社妓者 于 2009-5-29 15:07 编辑 ]
评论于：Prisoner of the State
09年5月24日 00:34
https://docs.google.com/View?id=dmrm5wh_66h48nphr Prisoner of the State The Secret Journal of Zhao Ziyang Translated and Edited by Bao Pu, Renee Chiang, and Adi Ignatius Foreword by Roderick MacFarquhar How often can you peek behind the curtains of one of the most secretive governments in the world? Prisoner of the State is the first book to give readers a front row seat to the inner workings of China. It is the story of Premier Zhao Ziyang, the man who brought liberal change to that nation and who, at the height of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, tried to stop the massacre and was dethroned for his efforts. When China's army moved in, killing hundres of students and other demonstrators, Zhao was placed under house arrest at his home in Beijing. China's most promising advocate for change had been disgraced, along with the policies he stood for. The Premier spent the last 16 years of his life, up until his death in 2005, in seclusion. An occasional detail about his life would slip out: reports of a golf excursion, a photo of his aging face, a leaked letter to China's leaders. But China scholars often lamented that Zhao never had his final say. As it turns out, Zhao did produce a memoir, in complete secrecy. He methodically recorded his thoughts and recollections on what had happened behind the scenes during many of modern China's most critical moments. The tapes he produced were smuggled out of the country and form the basis for Prisoner of the State. In this audio journal, Zhao provides intimate details about the Tiananmen crackdown; he describes the ploys and doublecrosses China's top leaders use to gain advantage over one another; and he talks of the necessity for China to adopt democracy in order to achive long-term stability. The China that Zhao portrays is not some long-lost dynasty. It is today's China, where the nation's leaders accept economic freedom but continue to resist political change. If Zhao had survived - that is, if the hard-line hadn't prevailed during Tiananmen - he might have been able to steer China's political system toward more openness and tolerance. Zhao's call to begin lifting the Party's control over China's life - to let freedom into the public square – is remarkable coming from a man who had once dominated that square. Although Zhao now speaks from the grave in this moving and riveting memoir, his voice has the moral power to make China sit up and listen. Table of Contents Preface Foreword PART 1: THE TIANANMEN MASSACRE 1: The Student Protests Begin => 4楼 2: An Editorial Makes Things Worse => 9楼 3: Power Struggle => 10楼 4: The Crackdown => 12楼 5: The Accusations Fly => 15楼 6: The Campaign Against Zhao => 16楼 7: Zhao's Talk with Gorbachev => 17楼 PART 2: HOUSE ARREST 1: Zhao Becomes a Prisoner The Investigative Report 2: Zhao's Lonely Struggle PART 3: THE ROOTS OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC BOOM PART 4: WAR IN THE POLITBURO PART 5: A TUMULTUOUS YEAR PART 6: HOW CHINA MUST CHANGE Epilogue A Brief Biography of Zhao Ziyang Who Was Who Acknowledgments Back cover [ 本帖最后由 真理社妓者 于 2009-5-31 00:32 编辑 ]
评论于：Prisoner of the State
09年5月17日 16:43
中文版和英文版尚未在香港上市 只接受预订
评论于：赵紫阳软禁期间讲话录音下载及 《国家的囚徒》选摘
09年5月15日 19:44
这不是《国家的囚徒》么
评论于：赵紫阳回忆录《国家的囚徒》购买信息及内页图
09年5月14日 10:16
4块7，也没交钱
评论于：影帝只吃了4块7
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